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Document of Interest Provided By Councilmember Hamann on Civilian Review Boards
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Document of Interest Provided By Councilmember Hamann on Civilian Review Boards
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Other activities <br />Based on its audits, the examiner recommends policy and <br />procedure changes to the police bureau in her quarterly <br />reports that the city council, acting as PIIAC, votes to <br />adopt. The chief must respond to the report in writing <br />within 60 days. The response must indicate what policy <br />or procedural changes within IA, if any, he has instituted <br />as a result of the report. If the chief does not respond <br />within 60 days, the examiner sends an e-mail reminding <br />him or telephones the IA commander. If the chief still <br />fails to respond, the city council can consider the matter. <br />Chapter 3 presents illustrative policy recommendations <br />PIIAC has made that the bureau has adopted. <br />Staffing and budget <br />Each of the four city council members appoints one <br />adviser; the police commissioner, who also is the mayor, <br />appoints two advisers; and each of seven neighborhood <br />coalitions chartered by the city recommends an adviser <br />to the city council for appointment. Advisers serve for <br />2 years, subject to reappointment. <br />The mayor appoints and funds the examiner, who spends <br />full time on oversight activities. The examiner’s salary <br />is $43,000. The mayor’s office also pays for oversight- <br />related duplication, telephone, and secretarial costs. <br />Distinctive features <br />The most unusual features of Portland’s oversight system <br />are, first, the use of citizen advisers to review completed <br />internal affairs investigations at the police station and, <br />second, the city council’s role in hearing citizen appeals. <br />• By trying to ensure that IA investigations are done <br />properly, the auditor’s approach may eliminate the <br />need for independent professionals to investigate citi- <br />zen complaints. This approach may reduce the costs <br />of citizen oversight. <br />• Because PIIAC does not accept citizen complaints, <br />some individuals may not report allegations of police <br />misconduct because they may be afraid to take their <br />complaints to the police bureau. Citizens do have the <br />option of filling out complaint forms at the neighbor- <br />hood coalitions represented among the citizen advisers, <br />which then forward the forms to IA. <br />• PIIAC examines only completed cases. As a result, <br />PIIAC cannot shape the conduct of individual investi- <br />gations while they are in progress. However, through <br />its audits, PIIAC may be able to motivate investigators <br />to do a better job overall. By not investigating cases, <br />the oversight procedure may receive better cooperation <br />from the police. <br />• Citizen advisers are not professional auditors. As a <br />result, they may not possess, or may need time to <br />learn, the skills needed to conduct a competent audit. <br />• Because a majority of citizen advisers are chosen by <br />neighborhood associations, citizens may be more likely <br />to feel they are well represented in the oversight <br />process than if advisers were chosen by city officials. <br />• The system does not require police officers to partici- <br />pate in the audit process. <br />• Because PIIAC and advisory board meetings are pub- <br />lic, and because PIIAC must publish periodic reports, <br />the media have an opportunity to focus on police <br />C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE: APPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION <br />45 <br />WHEN PIIAC AND IA DISAGREE <br />ON A FINDING <br />PIIAC disagreed with an IA finding three times in <br />1997. In two cases, the chief disagreed with PIIAC <br />and agreed with IA that there had been no officer <br />misconduct. In one of those two cases, PIIAC voted <br />4 to 1 to sustain an allegation of misuse of position <br />against an officer who wrote a police report docu- <br />menting that his neighbors’ unsupervised children <br />were making noise on a trampoline late one night <br />after the officer had tried to resolve the problem by <br />talking with the parents.The report suggested that <br />the State’s Child Services Division, which investigates <br />child abuse cases, become involved.The chief sup- <br />ported IA’s exoneration of the officer. In the third <br />case, PIIAC decided that IA was incorrect in deciding <br />that an officer had not violated bureau policy by <br />removing a child from school without notifying the <br />child’s parents.The officers felt that informing the <br />principal was adequate notification.The chief sided <br />with PIIAC.
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