Document of Interest Provided By Councilmember Hamann on Civilian Review Boards

Home Browse Search

the idea of a review commission, nominates its two sworn members, funds it, and houses it in the public safe- ty building. While San Francisco’s OCC operates inde- pendently of the police department and is funded by the city, its budget is a line item within the police department budget. The OCC director reports to the San Francisco Police Commission, which tries major discipline cases and ratifies policy and training changes. By contrast, an independent dispute resolution center operates Rochester’s Civilian Review Board, appoints board members, and receives funding to staff the procedure directly from the city council. Oversight systems differ in other respects. While most systems may provide policy and procedure recommenda- tions to the local police or sheriff’s department, San Francisco’s charter requires it to make policy recommen- dations. In addition, some systems rarely make recom- mendations, while others are constantly proposing them. Minneapolis and Rochester make considerable use of mediation. Until 1999, Berkeley’s mediation system, although required by statute, was dormant, while San Francisco has had difficulty getting complainants to agree to mediation. Other oversight systems offer no mediation option. The number of paid staff among the oversight systems examined ranges from 1 part-time person (St. Paul) to 30 full-time staff (San Francisco). Most systems have between four and five paid staff. Largely reflecting the number of paid staff, the systems’ budgets range from almost no special funding in Orange County to $2,198,778 in San Francisco. While four other budgets range from $100,000 to $275,000, St. Paul’s is slightly more than $37,000 and Minneapolis’ is slightly more than $500,000. Exhibit 2–2 illustrates the significant diversity in the type and extent of oversight activity levels. For example, San Francisco received 1,126 complaints in 1997, and 715 citizens contacted the Minneapolis program. Berkeley investigated 42 complaints. Orange County held 45 hear- ings in 1997, Berkeley 12, and Minneapolis 3. However, Minneapolis oversight staff also provided other assistance to 715 additional citizens. Exhibit 2–2 shows that the systems’ openness to the pub- lic also differs widely. At one extreme, Rochester reviews completed investigations in a private, sealed-off room in the city hall basement—even the citizen panelists have no access to internal affairs reports until the panelists meet, and they must surrender the materials before they dis- band. The panelists’ findings are not made public. St. Paul’s reviews also are conducted in private. By contrast, Orange County invites 57 media outlets to every board hearing, and the board members’ findings are announced. Some systems mix privacy with openness. Flint’s ombuds- man’s office conducts its investigations in private but then provides its detailed findings to the press and the city hall’s public archives. The chief’s hearings in San Francisco are private, but police commission trials have been attended by as many as 600 citizens and members of the press. Boards in Berkeley, Minneapolis, and Tucson conduct public meetings at which individual citi- zens can raise general concerns (not personal complaints) about police conduct. The boards then take up the concerns between meetings or at a future meeting. No oversight system publicizes the nature of the specific discipline subject officers receive—many jurisdictions prohibit such disclosure. This tremendous variation in how the nine oversight sys- tems conduct business may seem discouraging: The lack of similarity makes it difficult for other jurisdictions to make an automatic selection of commonly implemented oversight features around which they can structure their own oversight procedures. This diversity forces jurisdic- tions to take the time to pick and choose among a wide range of alternatives for designing their own oversight systems and to assess the benefits and limitations of each possible component. On the positive side, this diversity means jurisdictions do not have to feel they are obligated to follow rigorously any one model or approach; they have the freedom to tailor the various components of their system to the particular needs and characteristics of their populations, law enforcement agencies, statutes, union contracts, and pressure groups. Of course, the choices that are made may have important consequences for how much the oversight system will cost, how much it is utilized, and how satisfied citizens are with the com- plaint process—considerations that will in turn partially determine which options to select. Although the choices may be daunting, there is expert help available for making them. Key participants in all nine oversight systems have agreed to field telephone C HAPTER 2: CASE S TUDIES OF N INE O VERSIGHT P ROCEDURES 20