Document of Interest Provided By Councilmember Hamann on Civilian Review Boards

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Chapter 2: Case Studies of Nine Oversight Procedures This chapter presents brief case studies of nine oversight procedures arranged alphabetically by jurisdiction. The case studies concentrate primarily on the operational pro- cedures of the oversight mechanisms. Details about other aspects of the jurisdictions’ procedures are presented in other chapters of the report: • Chapter 3, “Other Oversight Responsibilities,” describes how the jurisdictions develop policy and procedure recommendations, implement mediation, and assist with early warning systems. • Oversight staffing arrangements are discussed in detail in chapter 4. • Chapter 5, “Addressing Important Issues in Citizen Oversight,” presents such problematic areas as intake, outreach, and “politics.” • Chapter 6 identifies the most common areas of conflict between oversight mechanisms and police and sheriff’s departments. • Monitoring, evaluation, and funding issues are addressed in chapter 7. Exhibit 2–1 identifies the location, type of system, princi- pal activities, and paid staff and budget for each oversight mechanism. Exhibit 2–2 summarizes the number of com- plaints, hearings, mediations, and other pertinent activi- ties each system conducted in 1997, the extent to which its proceedings are open to the public, whether it has sub- poena power, and the types of complaints it reviews. As the exhibits illustrate—and the case studies that fol- low explain—there is enormous variation in the structure and operations of the nine systems. In fact, dissimilarity, rather than similarity, is the rule among the nine systems. In part this is because radically different systems were selected for inclusion in this report to illustrate the diver- sity in oversight mechanisms from which other jurisdic- tions can choose if they wish to develop a procedure of their own or modify an existing one. However, the diver- sity also reflects the fact that local officials have shaped their oversight systems very differently to accommodate unique local pressures (e.g., from activist groups, police unions, or office holders), legal considerations (e.g., with regard to the types of information that can be made pub- lic or the provisions of labor-management agreements), funding resources, and honest disagreements about what would work best in their communities. All four types of oversight approaches listed in footnote a in exhibit 2–1 are represented among the nine oversight systems. However, two jurisdictions have combined two different approaches: Portland has a citizen appeals board (type 3) and an auditor who monitors the department’s complaint investigation process (type 4), while Tucson has a citizen board that reviews internal affairs findings (type 2) and also an auditor (type 4). Other “models” are not pure either; for example, while San Francisco’s Office of Citizen Complaints involves citizens in investi- gating complaints (type 1), OCC staff also prosecute cases at chief’s hearings and before the police commis- sion, a responsibility—and expense—that goes well beyond that of investigating complaints. Similarly, the Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority (CRA) not only hires professional staff to investigate complaints (type 1) but its volunteer board members also hold hear- ings for complaints for which investigators have found probable cause. Furthermore, the CRA executive director prosecutes these cases before the civilian review board. While San Francisco’s OCC and Minneapolis’ CRA both investigate most complaints in place of internal affairs, Berkeley’s Police Review Commission investigates cases simultaneously with internal affairs investigations. The St. Paul Police Civilian Internal Affairs Review Commission and San Francisco’s Office of Citizen Complaints recommend discipline to the chief. The independence of the nine oversight systems also varies considerably. The St. Paul police chief proposed C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE: APPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION 17