Document of Interest Provided By Councilmember Hamann on Civilian Review Boards

Home Browse Search

to Citizen Oversight” suggests other procedures that, taken together with citizen oversight and an effective internal affairs unit, may improve police accountability in departments in which officer conduct needs improvement. The effectiveness of citizen oversight depends enormously on who the principal parties are. In Minneapolis, there was “a complete turnaround” in the relationship between the police department and the Civilian Police Review Authority after a new chief and a new executive director took over and the new mayor made clear she expected them to cooper- ate. Supporting this observation, a subject officer in Minneapolis wrote on his anonymous customer satisfac- tion survey in 1998, “It appears as though there have been some changes in the factfinding process, which resulted in a more satisfactory outcome. In the past I was unable to give a favorable opinion of the Civilian Police Review Authority, but I was pleased with this openness.” Oversight bodies in the United States have limited authority. In particular, they do not have the power to discipline officers or establish depart- ment policies. In these areas, they are only advisory. Furthermore, oversight bodies have no influence on some police managers or, as a result, many or most line officers. According to one chief, “Boards can’t be effective because officers fear IA, not them.” Concerns about liability and supervi- sor criticisms may typically discour- age misconduct much more than either citizen oversight or internal affairs investigations. In a related vein, oversight proce- dures generally focus on individual officers, letting supervisors off the hook in terms of management’s responsibility for—and tremendous influence over—line officers’and deputies’behavior. As a result, unless the oversight system includes making recommendations for policy and procedure changes and has the ability to influ- ence their adoption, department supervisory and training practices that may be allowing misconduct to occur will C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE: APPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION 13 EXHIBIT 1–3. LIMITATIONS TO CITIZEN OVERSIGHT We need to review higher-ups’ behavior to pro- duce accountability among line officers. Otherwise, the beat officer gets scrutinized and the supervisors are never held accountable, never called to account. —Mary Dunlap, director of San Francisco’s Office of Citizen Complaints 1. Citizen oversight cannot by itself ensure police accountability. Jurisdictions need to implement other internal and external mechanisms to achieve this goal. 2. The effectiveness of citizen oversight depends enormously on the talent, fairness, and personalities of the principal individuals involved. 3. Oversight bodies have limited authority; they do not impose discipline or dictate department policies or procedures. 4. The findings some oversight bodies make, or the investigations they conduct, have no influence on some police managers. 5. Oversight bodies typically fail to hold department supervisors responsible for line officers’ behavior. 6. Some complainants who lose their cases express disappointment with the oversight process. 7. When long delays occur between filing a complaint and its resolution, complainants become frustrated and disillusioned—even when they win the case. 8. Some complainants and a small minority of other individuals will not be satisfied with the actions of police officers and deputy sheriffs no matter what the oversight body does. 9. Oversight procedures in some jurisdictions have exacerbated tensions among local officials, police and sheriff’s departments and unions, and citizen groups and activists.