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C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE: APPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION <br />129 <br />arranged in ascending order of budget levels along with <br />their activity levels for 1997. As shown, it is impossible <br />to compare activity levels among oversight systems <br />because different systems engage in different types of <br />activities—for example, investigations, hearings, media- <br />tions, and audits. Nevertheless, it is possible to examine <br />five different relationships between oversight budgets and <br />activity levels. <br />1. There is no association between budget levels and <br />overall activity levels among the nine systems. For <br />example, Rochester’s level of activity (26 cases <br />reviewed, 4 cases mediated) appears to be less than <br />Orange County’s, Portland’s, and St. Paul’s, even <br />though its budget is much higher. Tucson, with a <br />budget of more than $144,000, monitored 63 investi- <br />gations, while Portland, relying on a single staff per- <br />son’s salary of $43,000, audited 98 cases and <br />processed 112 appeals. <br />2. There is a clear association between higher budgets <br />and whether a system conducts investigations: All <br />four systems with the highest budgets are type 1 sys- <br />tems (which investigate citizen complaints). These <br />systems are the most expensive because they have to <br />hire professional investigators rather than rely on vol- <br />unteers. It also appears that, the higher the 1997 budg- <br />et among these four type 1 oversight systems that <br />conduct investigations, the more overall activity (not <br />just investigations) they engaged in. For example, <br />while Flint conducted more investigations (313) than <br />either Berkeley (42) or Minneapolis (159), Berkeley <br />conducted 12 hearings and 34 preliminary investiga- <br />tions, and Minneapolis provided assistance to 715 cit- <br />izens as well as arranged for 14 cases to be mediated. <br />(If the Minneapolis and San Francisco oversight bod- <br />ies did not conduct investigations, their respective <br />police departments would have to hire additional <br />internal affairs investigators [unless they could trans- <br />fer existing personnel] to perform the work the over- <br />sight bodies had been conducting. As a result, the <br />additional money that oversight bodies need to con- <br />duct investigations does not cost the city, town, or <br />DATA BARRIERS TO EVALUATING OVERSIGHT PROCEDURES <br />It would seem logical to evaluate the success of citizen oversight by determining whether complaints increase or <br />decrease after the system becomes operational.The natural assumption is that, over time, complaints will decline <br />as the oversight system begins to play a part in reducing officer misconduct. However, complaints may increase <br />because the intake process has been simplified or made more accessible or because public confidence in the <br />review process has increased. Furthermore, there are rarely complete—or any—baseline data on the actual <br />number of incidents of police misconduct.* <br />Case review data also are suspect.The number of cases reviewed by the Rochester Civilian Review Board <br />declined significantly one year and rose the next.The decline occurred because there had been several shootings, <br />and IA investigators had to drop less serious investigations and delay examining new ones while they investigated <br />the complex and high-profile shootings. Staff turnover among investigators further delayed investigations. More <br />cases were investigated the following year after staffing problems ended and investigators caught up on their <br />backlog of less serious cases. <br />Examining changes in community attitudes toward the police would provide more valid information on oversight <br />effectiveness. However, these data, too, may be misleading because many other events may be taking place simulta- <br />neously in the community that could change the public’s attitudes toward the police, including community policing <br />or a new police chief who is more strict or more lax about discipline than his or her predecessor. Finally, it is <br />difficult to compare the effectiveness of different citizen review models because they have different goals, <br />resources, and constraints. <br />* Walker, Samuel, and Vic W. Bumphus,“The Effectiveness of Civilian Review: Observations on Recent Trends and New Issues Regarding the <br />Civilian Review of Police,” American Journal of Police 11 (4) (1992): 1–26.