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C HAPTER 7: MONITORING, EVALUATION, AND F UNDING <br />128 <br />9. Provide the public with a “window” on how the <br />police or sheriff’s department investigates allegations <br />of officer misconduct. <br />10. Increase legitimate citizen complaints by, for example: <br />• Providing an avenue for filing complaints that is <br />less intimidating than going to the police or sher- <br />iff’s department. <br />• Increasing confidence that com- <br />plaints will be taken seriously. <br />• Providing more accessible loca- <br />tions for filing. <br />11. Provide an open and independent <br />forum for the public to express <br />general concerns about the police <br />or sheriff’s department’s opera- <br />tions or about officer conduct. <br />12. Provide a mechanism through <br />which citizens can suggest recom- <br />mendations for improving police policies and proce- <br />dures and police training. <br />13. Establish a mediation option for resolving selected <br />complaints to achieve one or more of the potential <br />benefits of mediation identified in chapter 3. <br />After establishing objectives, program planners and <br />administrators need to determine how they will know <br />whether each one has been achieved in terms of: <br />• What level of activity will be considered a success <br />(e.g., 10 fewer police shootings in each of the next 2 <br />years compared with the average number of shootings <br />during each of the previous 10 years; a 15-percent <br />increase within 2 years of citizens who feel confident <br />the department is disciplining officers appropriately). <br />• How the necessary data will be gathered (e.g., police <br />records of use of firearms over a 12-year period; public <br />survey of community attitudes toward the police before <br />the oversight procedure was initiated and 2 years later). <br />There are other barriers to evaluation in addition to <br />the failure to develop measurable objectives. Many <br />administrators consider monitoring and evaluating <br />program activities a low priority. They may lack the time, <br />money, or expertise to assess their programs, or they may <br />be concerned that negative results may jeopardize their <br />funding and even their positions. Finally, even with solid <br />objectives and the time, skills, and will to conduct a useful <br />evaluation, there may be problems with the data that make <br />it difficult to draw valid conclusions about the oversight <br />system’s effectiveness (see “Data Barriers to Evaluating <br />Oversight Procedures”). <br />The Albuquerque evaluation <br />Despite these concerns and barriers, <br />assessing program effectiveness is <br />essential for learning how to improve <br />oversight operations and for demon- <br />strating that the oversight process <br />should be maintained or expanded. <br />Reflecting this need, the Albuquerque <br />City Council commissioned a $27,602 <br />evaluation of its oversight system and <br />used many of the findings in restruc- <br />turing its procedures (see “The Albuquerque City Council <br />Commissioned a Thorough Evaluation”). Although this <br />approach may cost more money than jurisdictions are <br />able to spend, other cities and counties easily can afford <br />to implement parts of the evaluation. <br />Funding <br />Oversight bodies have dramatically different budgets: <br />Some, such as the review board in Orange County, cost <br />relatively little because they rely almost entirely on <br />volunteers and in-kind services, while others, such as <br />those in Flint and Minneapolis, run into the hundreds of <br />thousands of dollars (see exhibit 7–2). San Francisco’s <br />oversight budget is more than $2 million. <br />The relationship between oversight costs <br />and oversight activity <br />In most organizations, there is a relationship between <br />expenditures and results—that is, the more money <br />spent, the more or better the results. Are increased <br />expenditures for oversight associated with increased <br />utilization—that is, do oversight systems get what they <br />pay for? Exhibit 7–2 presents the nine oversight systems <br />The Albuquerque City <br />Council commissioned a <br />$27,602 evaluation of <br />its oversight system and <br />used many of the <br />findings in restructuring <br />its procedures.