Document of Interest Provided By Councilmember Hamann on Civilian Review Boards

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C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE: APPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION 105 there were times when the mayor expressed concern about the auditor’s statements. • The Berkeley Police Review Commission officer is staff to the city manager, who appoints her, but the perception among the public and police department is that she is staff to PRC. The city manager in effect delegates his oversight role to the PRC officer. As a result, the officer needs to maintain good relations with both PRC and the city manager. In one jurisdiction, board members do not consult with the council members who appointed them when reviewing specific cases. However, because some council members tend to side with the police, and others are hostile to the department, they appoint board members sympathetic to their respec- tive positions. As a result, the board is split between pro- and anti-police factions. Politics also can work for the good. In some jurisdictions, the police chief cooperates with the oversight process at least in part because the mayor demands support for it. Because the Minneapolis city council president led the effort to revamp the city’s oversight system before she became president, all the involved parties under- stand that she expects them to cooperate. Agendas on the part of volunteers When they are appointed by the mayor or council mem- bers, volunteer board members may feel, as Lt. Robert Skomra, former head of IA in Minneapolis, pointed out, that “they represent a special interest and see themselves as champions for that group.” As one city council mem- ber said, “Some board members play to the tune of the city council member who appoints them.” In one juris- diction, some board members have supported the elec- toral campaigns of the council members who appointed them; these volunteers may feel especially obligated to reflect “their” council member’s political views. A partial solution to this problem of volunteer bias may be mediation training. Volunteer board members in Rochester all must become certified mediators, which may increase their ability to provide impartial reviews (see chapter 4, “Staffing”). Another approach to ensuring board members’ objectivity is to avoid having govern- ment officials select them. Each of seven neighborhood coalitions recommends one individual adviser to serve as a citizen adviser in Portland. Board members in Rochester are selected by the review board’s screening committee, consist- ing of board chairpersons and staff. As a result, according to Anne Pokras, former director of special projects for the board’s parent agency, “Panelists have a heightened awareness that they represent no one—that is, no politi- cian—but everyone—that is, the community.” Some Portland residents have called for the election of board members. However, according to a local activist, this might result in the police union’s providing more campaign funds to candidates sympathetic to their posi- tions than other candidates could raise (see “Working With the Union” in chapter 6). Of course, not all disagreement among elected and appointed officials and not all bias among oversight vol- unteers is politically motivated in the sense of serving narrow self-interests. Many clashes over citizen oversight are the result of genuine differences of opinion on what is, after all, a controversial topic. Chapter 6 identifies some of these conflicts as they relate to oversight bodies and police and sheriff’s departments. Notes 1. Walker, Samuel,Citizen Review Resource Manual, Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum, 1995: 6–7. 2. Ibid., 13. Of course, not all disagree- ment among elected and appointed officials and not all bias among oversight volunteers is politically motivated in the sense of serving narrow self-interests. Many clashes over citizen oversight are the result of genuine differences of opinion on what is, after all, a controversial topic.