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Document of Interest Provided By Councilmember Hamann on Civilian Review Boards
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Document of Interest Provided By Councilmember Hamann on Civilian Review Boards
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C HAPTER 5: ADDRESSING I MPORTANT I SSUES IN C ITIZEN O VERSIGHT <br />104 <br />Politics <br />“Politics” may interfere in two respects with the effective <br />operation of citizen oversight. <br />Conflict among local government officials <br />Conflict among elected and appointed officials in a juris- <br />diction over the operation of citizen oversight can disrupt <br />the review process. In Flint, the mayor appoints the <br />police chief, but the city council appoints the ombuds- <br />man. If the mayor and council do not see eye to eye, <br />there is the potential for conflict with the ombudsman <br />becoming the chief’s adversary. Even when there is a <br />good working relationship among the involved officials <br />in a jurisdiction, turnover through new elections or <br />appointments can result in new personnel who wish to <br />have things done “their way.” <br />Sometimes, ambiguity in the lines of authority and com- <br />munication creates the potential for controversy: <br />• The Portland mayor appoints and hires the auditor, <br />but the auditor feels she is legally responsible to the <br />board—which is the city council sitting en bloc— <br />because she acts as the board’s executive director. Who <br />her true legal supervisor is has never been tested. The <br />auditor is also in an awkward position whenever her <br />reports are critical of the city because what she says <br />could make the city liable for damages. As a result, <br />THE SAN JOSE OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE AUDITOR ANNUAL <br />REPORT IS PARTICULARLY INFORMATIVE <br />The 1997 Year End Report of the San Jose Office of the Independent Police Auditor is a particularly comprehensive and <br />well-presented document.The 58-page, spiral-bound report, with a glossy burgundy cover, includes: <br />• Biographical sketches of office staff. <br />• An 11-page executive summary printed on burgundy-colored pages. <br />• A flowchart illustrating the complaint process. <br />• A discussion of complaint timeliness that includes a chart illustrating a sample of 10 cases and the number of <br />days a complaint remained at different stages of the review process (see exhibit 5–4). <br />• The types of complaints and sustained cases by city council district for the previous 3 years. <br />• A chart showing the type of alleged unnecessary force used by body area affected and degree of injury. <br />• Demographic information about complainants, including gender, ethnicity, age, educational level, and occupation. <br />• Statistical information about subject officers, including bureau, gender, years of experience, type of allegation by <br />years of experience, and police unit in which they work(ed). <br />• A chart showing discipline imposed. <br />• A discussion of the criteria for evaluating internal affairs investigations and the auditor’s findings related to <br />each criterion. <br />• Summaries of seven selected audited cases. <br />• A chart showing the status of every policy recommendation the auditor has presented and its disposition since <br />the office was established in 1993.
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