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preservation. If, for example, property owners are able to divide their property interests into discrete segments, then it would be virtivally impossible to protect historic estates from being subdivided and devel- oped on the basis of separate taking challenges for each property segment. (Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d 528 (Wis. 1996).) The controversy in this case centered on the rezoning of a 10.4 acre parcel of land owned by Alfred Zealy. The parcel, once part of a larger, 250 acre tract of land, was originally zoned as A- 3, allowing for agricultural use. In 1967, the City of Waukesha an- nexed the property and rezoned it as R-1, allowing for residential use. Later on, the City rezoned a small area of the parcel as B-4, allowing for business use. Mr. Zealy continued to use his property for farming until 1981, at which time he began to sell off his property, leaving 10.4 acres in his possession. Zealy used his remain- ing property for peat mining. In 1982, the City established a Con- servancy District, rezoning approxi- mately 8.2 acres of Mr. Zealy's property as C-1. The C-1 designa- tion allows for agricultural use. The remaining acres continued to be zoned for residential and business use. After designation of the proper- ty as a conservancy district, the City reduced the assessed value of Mr. Zealy's 10.4 acre parcel from $81,000 to $57,000. Mr. Zealy never sought to de- velop his property or to have it rezoned. Rather, he filed an inverse condemnation action in state court alleging that the City's rezoning of his property constituted a regulato- ry taking. He also argued that the City should be equitably estopped from rezoning his property based on earlier representations made to him by the City concerning the develop- ment of his land for residential use. The trial court dismissed the lawsuit on both grounds. The Court of Appeals subsequently reversed the trial court with respect to the takings issues. In ruling in favor of Mr. Zealy, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court had erred by considering the parcel as a whole in assessing Mr. Zealy's tak- ing claim. The appeals court, ac- cordingly, reversed and remanded the trial court's decision, directing the trial court to determine the degree, of interference with the "landowners's anticipated and dis- tinct investment opportunities." See Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 534 N.W.2d 917 (Wis. App. 1995). The Court's Decision. The Su- preme Court of Wisconsin reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court's decision. The high court ruled that the trial court had properly determined that the prop- erty interest, for purposes of assess- ing whether a taking has occurred, is the entire 10.4 acre parcel. Since Mr. Zealy could continue to use the 8.2 acres of his property for agricultural use and the remaining land for business and residential use, the court determined that Mr. Zealy was not deprived of "all or substantially all practical use of his property." As a preliminary matter, the Wisconsin Supreme Court observed that it could dismiss this case on Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Before determining whether a taking of property has indeed oc- curred, the Wisconsin court ex- plained, a court must determine the property at issue. Upon examina- tion of U.S. Supreme Court prece- dent on this issue, the court con- cluded that the landowner's proper- ty should be considered as a whole rather than as discrete segments. Citing specifically to Penn Central, the Wisconsin court stated: "Taking'" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular seg- ment have been entirely abrogated. in deciding whether a particular govern- mental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather on the character of the actions and on the nature and extent of he interference with rights in the parcel as a whole." In exploring this issue further, the Wisconsin court observed that the U.S. Supreme Court had previ- ously rejected efforts to segment property for purposes of establish- ing a regulatory taking in Penn Central (cited above) and Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn v. DeBene- dictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). While justice Scalia, in writing for the Supreme Court, voiced concern regarding the application of the "parcel as a whole" rule in certain circumstances in footnote 7 of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,1016-17, n7 (1992), the Wisconsin court noted that justice Scalia's observations were mere "dicta," since the issue of whether property should be seg- mented was not before the Lucas court. (In Lucas, the Supreme Court ripeness grounds since Mr. Zealy 1 had never sought to have his prop- erty rezoned or attempted to Bevel - op his property. However, the court concluded that "addressing the mer- its of the case at bar would best serve the interests of justice" by settling issues "presently unclear in our law of regulatory takings." Turning to the merits of Mr. Zealy's takings claim, the court then proceeded to identify the stan- dard for determining whether a taking has occurred. Relying on U.S. Supreme Court precedent for guidance, the Wisconsin court stat- ed that to establish a regulatory taking, the "regulation must deny the landowner all or substantially all practical uses of a property in order to be considered a taking for which compensation is required." In addressing this issue, the ` Wisconsin Supreme Court initially . observed that its approach to regu- latory takings is consistent with that of the United States Supreme Court. The court noted that in Wisconsin, a takings analysis essen- tially involves the resolution of two competing concerns: "respect for the property rights of individuals" and "recognition that the govern- ment retains the ability, in further- ance of the interests of all citizens, to regulate an owner's potential uses of land." While there is no set formula for measuring a takings claim, the court stated that it gen- erally involves consideration of several factors, namely: (1) "the character of the governmental ac- tion;'" (2) "'the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant;'" and (3) "'the extent to which the regulation has interfered with dis- investment tinct -backed expecta- tions,'" (quoting from Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Before determining whether a taking of property has indeed oc- curred, the Wisconsin court ex- plained, a court must determine the property at issue. Upon examina- tion of U.S. Supreme Court prece- dent on this issue, the court con- cluded that the landowner's proper- ty should be considered as a whole rather than as discrete segments. Citing specifically to Penn Central, the Wisconsin court stated: "Taking'" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular seg- ment have been entirely abrogated. in deciding whether a particular govern- mental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather on the character of the actions and on the nature and extent of he interference with rights in the parcel as a whole." In exploring this issue further, the Wisconsin court observed that the U.S. Supreme Court had previ- ously rejected efforts to segment property for purposes of establish- ing a regulatory taking in Penn Central (cited above) and Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn v. DeBene- dictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). While justice Scalia, in writing for the Supreme Court, voiced concern regarding the application of the "parcel as a whole" rule in certain circumstances in footnote 7 of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,1016-17, n7 (1992), the Wisconsin court noted that justice Scalia's observations were mere "dicta," since the issue of whether property should be seg- mented was not before the Lucas court. (In Lucas, the Supreme Court