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addressed allegations that a categor- ical taking had occurred because the owner had been denied all use of his property.) Moreover, the Wis- consin Court observed, the U.S. Supreme court adhered to the par- cel as a whole rule in the context of a subsequent regulatory takings decision in which Justice Scalia joined, Concrete Pipe and Products v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602 (19931. Turning specifically to the Court of Appeals' decision in this case; the court observed that appli- cation of the lower court's ruling, that courts should consider a land- owner's "anticipated and distinct investment opportunities" in defin- ing the property, may prove diffi- cult. The court stated: Looking to a landowner's anticipated use of various parcels and sub -parcels off land in order to determine the extent of the parcel at issue would require ascertaining a landowner's subjective intent before being able to evaluate a possible takings claim. This would confuse both the agencies responsible for zoning and the courts called on to adjudicate such claims, and increase the difficulty o an al- ready complex inquiry. The Wisconsin Supreme Court also determined that the lower court's reliance on two cases where seg- mentation of property was allowed, Ciampatti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310 (1991) and Loveladies Har- bor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 . (1983), was misplaced since those cases are distinguishable on the facts. Upon determining that the property at issue is Mr. Zealy's entire 10.4 acre parcel, the Wiscon- sin Supreme Court proceeded to examine the record to determine if a taking had occurred in this case. Significantly, the court rejected Mr. Zealy's argument that loss of value should be based on what the land is worth rather than its value in its "natural state." Quoting from its previous decision in Just v Mariette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972), the court stated: [The landowners] argue their property has been severely depreciated in value. But this depreciation of value is not based on the use of the land in its natural state but on what the land would be worth if it could be filled and used for the location of a dwell- ing. While loss of value is to be con- sidered in determining whether a restriction is a constructive taking, value based upon changing the char- acter of the land at the expense of harm to public rights is not an essen- tial factor or controlling. Ultimately, the court ruled that it could not "conclude that the City's rezoning deprived Zealy of all or substantially all of the use of his land." The court observed that Mr. Zealy can continue to use the 8.2 acres zoned as C-1 for farming, and the balance of his property for busi- ness and residential use. Analysis. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin's ruling in Zealy v. City of Waukesha, may be viewed as just one court's response to the issue of how to define the property interest in determining whether a regulatory taking has occurred. However, many experts view Wis- consin's takings law as an impor- tant reaffirmation of the basic prin- ciples of takings jurisprudence set out by the U.S. Supreme Court in Penn Central—principles that con- tinue to be critically important to the effectiveness of local landmark laws across the country. 4 ` 3 V 11 ViAll r< w Seventh Circuit Ruling in Chicago Landmarks Case Limits Right of Local Governments to Remove Preservation Challenges to Federal Court International College of Surgeons Reversed and Remanded to State Court The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has reversed the decision of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in International College of Sur- geons v. City of Chicago, No. 91 C 1587 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 30, 1994). The Seventh Circuit ruled that the federal district court had improperly deter- mined that it had subject matter jurisdiction in. this case, concluding that an ac- tion seeking judicial review of a state administrative agency decision may not be removed from state to federal court under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(a), even though the lawsuit in- cludes federal constitutional claims. According to the court, removal is appropriate only if all actions before the court can be characterized as "civil actions," and that ad- ministrative appeals do not constitute such actions. The plaintiff's lawsuit against the City included two actions which involved "appel- late review" of the final deci- sions of the Commission on the Chicago Architectural and Historical Landmarks under the Illinois Administrative Review Act. Because the fed- eral district court did not have`` "original" jurisdiction over these claims, the Seventh Cir- cuit concluded that the entire case must be remanded to the Cook County Circuit Court as a matter of law. The Circuit Court's deci- sion sets aside a well-written federal district court decision that provided important guidelines on a wide range of constitutional and administra- tive issues affecting Iocal his- toric preservation programs. See, "Federal District Court Upholds Denial of Permit to Demolish Chicago Landmarks in .Broad-based Lawsuit," 14 PLR 1087 (May 1995). The district court had addressed