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REGULAR MEETING <br />"Any power conferred upon a city by this chapter <br />(18- 1 -1.5 -1 - 18- 1- 1.5 -30) or by any other law shall <br />be exercised only in accordance with such method or <br />procedure as may be provided by law. If no method <br />or procedure is provided by law for the exercise of <br />any such power, the common council of any city may, <br />by ordinance, provide a method or procedure for the <br />exercise of such power, and may limit the exercise <br />of any power in any manner not in conflict with this <br />chapter or any other law. (I.C. 971, 18- 1- 1.5 -17, <br />as added by Acts 1971, P.L. 250, 1 1, p. 955.)." <br />FEBRUARY 9, 1976 <br />Presently no procedures exist whereby an investigation can be conducted of the January 19, <br />incident involving Councilman Kopczynski and Councilman Taylor. If such procedures were <br />to be developed they would have to be approved by ordinance as provided by Section 17. In <br />view of the serious effect which a discipline proceeding can have on an elected representative'. <br />reputation in the community, it is the opinion of this office that any procedures which are de- <br />veloped by the Common Council for the internal discipline of its members in the future should <br />be subject to strict due process guarantees. It is the further opinion of this office that the <br />retroactive application of such strict due process guarantees to the January 19th incident raise <br />serious questions relative to the right of the Council to punish a member for activities which <br />occurred prior to the enactment of due process procedures. In view of the ex post facto nature <br />of any procedure which might be developed to apply to an investigation of the January 19 in- <br />cident it is the opinion of this office that any such investigation would likely be outside the <br />scope of authority and jurisdiction of the Council since the rights of the Councilman to be <br />investigated would be inadequately protected. Be advised that this memorandum of law is pro- <br />vided pursuant to the direction of the Common Council and is not to be construed as a ratifica- <br />tion of any prior action by the Common Council or any of its members relative to the January 19 <br />incident nor is it to be construed as a willingness on the part of the City Attorney's office <br />to furnish advice to the Common Council relative to this incident in the future except insofar <br />as the Common Council is determined to be acting within the scope of its authority and jurisdic <br />tion. <br />Council President Parent then called upon the Council attorney to submit her report. <br />Kathleen Cekanski, Council attorney, read her report: Powers of Common Councils in Second <br />Class Cities to punish its own members for alledged disorderly behavior. I. INTRODUCTION <br />Pursuant to your request of February 2, 1976, this memorandum sets forth much of the informa- <br />tion discovered when researching the above - entitled topic. It is divided into seven (7) main <br />sections, namely: I. Introduction, II. Issues Presented, III. Federal Precedents, IV. The <br />State of Indiana, V. The City of South Bend, VI. Conclusion and Recommendations, VII. Biblio <br />graphy. In order to have a thorough understanding of many of the practical and legal issues <br />involved, it is requested that each council member review in its entirety the entire memoradum <br />before taking any action on this topic. II. ISSUES PRESENTED (1) Do legislators at the <br />Federal level have the right to discipline one of its own members? (See III) (2) Do legislator <br />at the state level have the right to discipline one of its own members? (see IV) (3) Do common <br />councils of second class cities within the state of Indiana have the right to discipline one of <br />its own members? (see V) III. FEDERAL-PRECEDENTS The question of whether a legislature has <br />the right to inquire into and possibly discipline its own members is addressed in the U.S. Con- <br />stitution. Article I, Section 5, Clause 2 provides: Each House may determine the rules of its <br />proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and with the concurrence of two - thirds <br />expel a member. It is from this provision that our legislative branch gains self - regulations. <br />The Supreme Court case of Powell vs. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) is most applicable. This <br />case involved the question of whether Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., who was duly elected to serve <br />in the U. S. House of Representatives for the 90th Congress, could be excluded from his seat <br />based on the allegations of misappropriation of public funds and abuse of process-in the New <br />York courts. The _Supreme Court held in a declaratory judgment that this exclusion was unlaw- <br />ful, IBID, p. 489. However, the constitutional aspects of the Powell case give excellent stan <br />dards for legislative inquiries into its own members: Unquestionably, Congress has an interes <br />in preserving its institutional integrity, but in most cases that interest can be sufficiently <br />safeguarded by the exercise of its power to punish its members for disorderly behavior and in <br />extreme cases, to expel a member with the concurrence of two- thirds. Congress has on specific <br />occasions disciplined its own members. Such legislative punishment should be rational and <br />relate to the purpose for which they are applied. For example "a loss of seniority as punish- <br />ment for disruptive behavior or misuse of a committee chairmanship would undoubtedly be reason- <br />able and thus constitutional." The test should ultimately be one of "balancing the appropriat <br />ness of a decision against the need for it. The relevant factors to be considered would in- <br />clude the degree of harm to the complainant, if immediate relief was denied; the likelihood <br />the legislature will report the alledged transgression and rectify it without intervention, an <br />the significance of legal standards in resolving the dispute. Thus except as regards to ex- <br />press constitutional prohibitions, the choices regarding grounds of punishment, procedures, <br />and sanctions have been left largely to the discretion of each house. Examples of punishment <br />for fellow legislators have included taking away seniority, fines, public and private censure, <br />suspension and change of committee assignments. Suspension has only been used twice in the <br />cases of Senators McLauren and Tillman; whereas censure has been used with the more recent ex- <br />ample of Senator Dodd. The minimum requirements of proper notice, hearing and review was met <br />in each of these situations, and were governed by strict legal procedures. Thus the power to <br />discipline fellow legislators at the federal level is well - founded in our legislative history. <br />IV. THE STATE OF INDIANA The constitution of the State of Indiana also provides for dis- <br />orderly behavior to be punished. Article 4, Section 14 provides that: Either House may <br />punish its members for disorderly behavior and may, with the concurrence of two- thirds, expel <br />a member; but not a second time for the same cause. Thus the language is almost identical to <br />Article I, Section 5, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution. <br />