Document of Interest Provided By Councilmember Hamann on Civilian Review Boards

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citizens have agreed on the need for a change. This broad-based support may have more weight with the chief and local government than if only the auditor or the board propose the change. —In time, a division of labor may evolve in which the auditor devotes most of her efforts to reviewing cases (as she already does) and the board focuses on developing policy recommendations. •The dual oversight system provides citizens with two avenues outside the police department for registering dissatisfaction with IA investigations. •The dual oversight system can involve some redundan- cy—that is, the auditor and board are both engaged in conducting audits and recommending policy changes, activities that either one of them could do effectively without the other. Redundancy could then impose an unnecessary financial cost on taxpayers. The potential for redundancy will be increased if one of the follow- ing occurs: —The auditor and chairperson of the board fail to cooperate because of personality differences, lack of interpersonal skills, an uncontrolled desire for publicity or power, or strongly held and antithetical views regarding the nature of police work. —Political dissension arises between the city manag- er, who appoints the auditor, and the city council, which appoints board. •Neither the auditor nor the board has the legal authority to conduct investigations into alleged police misconduct themselves, and they do not have subpoena power. Rather, they audit, monitor, and publicize IA’s conduct of investigations. By ensuring that IA investigations are done properly, the auditor approach may eliminate the need for independent professionals to investigate citizen complaints. This may reduce the cost of citizen oversight. •Citizens have three choices about where to file—or refile—a complaint: with IA, the auditor, and the board. This approach enables complainants “to shop for the best deal.”It also, in the words of a police officer, gives them “three bites at the apple”: If they are dissatisfied with the finding by one office, they can take their complaint to the others. The auditor’s Web address is www.ci.tucson.az.us/ia.html. For further information, contact: Liana Perez Independent Police Auditor Office of the Independent Police Auditor 255 West Alameda First Floor, South Tucson, AZ 85726–7210 520–791–5176 Suzanne Elefante Chairperson, Citizens Police Advisory Review Board 2041 South Craycroft Tucson, AZ 85711 520–790–4702 Capt. George Stoner Tucson Police Department 270 South Stone Avenue Tucson, AZ 85701 520–791–4441, ext. 1503 Teresa Guerrero-Daley Independent Police Auditor, City of San Jose 4 North Second Street, Suite 650 San Jose, CA 95113 408–977–0652 C HAPTER 2: CASE S TUDIES OF N INE O VERSIGHT P ROCEDURES 68