Document of Interest Provided By Councilmember Hamann on Civilian Review Boards

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an evaluation on her each year and invites them to sit in on the in-person evaluation. He considers how she has managed the office as well as her litigation skills, public relations work, and timeliness (for example, whether she allowed too many extensions because she failed to super- vise the investigators adequately). The executive director hires the three investigators—typically former police officers from other departments—and clerical staff. The CRA’s 1998 budget appropriation was $504,213 (see exhibit 2–9). More than three-quarters of the funding is for the salaries and benefits of seven staff: the executive director, three case investigators, a program assistant, and two clerk typists. Distinctive features The Minneapolis oversight system is unusual in that paid staff investigate most citizen complaints, while volunteers conduct hearings that result in findings the chief must accept. The system has several other notable features. • Because the board appoints the executive director, she may be better shielded from political influence than if the mayor or city council appointed her. However, because the board hires the executive director, there could be a tendency on her part to accommodate the board’s concerns rather than to act as a check and bal- ance on each other (for example, when the executive director prosecutes cases before the board). • Because most CRA investigators are former police officers, they have a good understanding of the nature of police work (see chapter 4, “Staffing”). At the same Budget Item Funding Level Salaries and wages $323,303 Benefits 68,518 Total personnel 391,821 Operating costs 33,169 Equipment 2,000 Contractual services 77,223 Total nonpersonnel 112,392 Total expenses $504,213 C HAPTER 2: CASE S TUDIES OF N INE O VERSIGHT P ROCEDURES 36 EXHIBIT 2–9. MINNEAPOLIS CIVILIAN POLICE REVIEW AUTHORITY 1998 BUDGET time, civilians with no professional experience as sworn officers conduct the hearings. As a result, CRA combines law enforcement and citizen perspectives. • Using former police officers as investigators may result in bias in favor of officers; their use may also reduce the program’s capacity for objectivity in the eyes of some citizens and community groups. Using former police officers as investigators may reduce opposition to the process among line officers and union leaders. • Because the complainant may not attend the hearing except to give testimony and hear the attorneys’ con- cluding statements, the complainant does not know why the case was won or lost. • On one hand, offering stipulations reduces the number of cases CRA has to hear, which enables it to hear other cases more expeditiously. On the other hand, in some cases, stipulation can prevent mediation, when mediation might be useful as a procedure for educating the officer and the complainant to each other’s points of view. • By reducing the amount of time panelists have to spend at hearings deciding what types of evidence to allow, prehearings speed the process. Prehearings also offer another opportunity for subject officers to agree to stipulate as they reconsider the strength of the case against them. • In its investigatory capacity, CRA is supposed to be a neutral party between the complainant and the police officer. However, if the case goes to a hearing, the CRA executive director prosecutes the officer. This dual role could confuse the public, complainants, and police officers. For further information, contact: Patricia Hughes, J.D. Executive Director Civilian Police Review Authority City of Minneapolis 400 South Fourth Street, Suite 1004 Minneapolis, MN 55415–1424 612–370–3800