Document of Interest Provided By Councilmember Hamann on Civilian Review Boards

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C HAPTER 8: ADDITIONAL S OURCES OF H ELP 138 Oversight bodies also produce annual reports. Minneapolis’ Civilian Police Review Authority, Rochester’s Civilian Review Board, San Francisco’s Office of Citizen Complaints, and San Jose’s Office of the Independent Police Auditor prepare especially informative annual reports (see the discussion on reports in chapter 5, “Addressing Important Issues in Citizen Oversight”). For guidance in developing a program brochure, exam- ine the brochures prepared by the oversight bodies in Minneapolis, Rochester, San Francisco (in English and Spanish), San Jose, and Tucson. Several jurisdictions have prepared reports recommending modifications to their existing oversight procedures. These reports pro- vide valuable discussions of alternative approaches to citizen oversight. See, for example, the following (avail- able from the oversight bodies): ALBUQUERQUE,PORTLAND,AND TUCSON DID THEIR OWN RESEARCH Albuquerque, Portland, and Tucson conducted reviews of oversight procedures in other jurisdictions to learn how best to improve their own oversight systems. Albuquerque According to Linda Stewart, an aide to the Albuquerque mayor, because of a rash of police shootings in 1997, the city council established an ad hoc committee on public safety consisting of three city counselors and staff. Members visited San Jose and Long Beach and conducted conference calls with other cities.The city council’s leg- islative policy analyst convened a town hall meeting for 300 people to hear their concerns. Finally, the committee appointed and the analyst assembled a task force of seven individuals representing community organizations (e.g., the American Civil Liberties Union and the police department and union). The group met every 2 or 3 weeks for 6 months to identify areas of agreement and disagreement in terms of what kind of citizen oversight system to establish.The members reviewed “stacks” of ordinances from other cities and also had an evaluation report assessing the current oversight system. The task force presented five different models to the city council for consideration. The legislative analyst merged the best of the models into a single ordinance, which the council approved. According to Stewart,“The most important part of the process was inviting the activists who were so dissatisfied with the police to sit down and forcing them to explain what they wanted done.” The mayor and chief supported the ordinance, and the mayor was getting ready to sign it. Portland In 1992, the Portland City Council appointed the mayor to chair the Police Internal Investigations Auditing Committee (PIIAC) with the expectation that she would evaluate its operations and recommend improvements. (Members of PIIAC had resigned in protest, alleging the group was ineffective.) The mayor reviewed recent assessments of the PIIAC process, including a self-assessment by the citizen advisers, the auditor’s reports, and proposals from community organizations. She also reviewed citizen oversight systems in other jurisdictions and consulted with citizens who had filed complaints with PIIAC. She attended adviser meetings and the city council’s public hearing on PIIAC. As a result of this research, the mayor prepared a report to the city council that included five pages of recom- mended changes to the PIIAC process to address primarily three identified PIIAC weaknesses: complainants’ feelings of intimidation using PIIAC; the perceived failure of the citizen advisers to address policy issues inherent in cases; and advisers’ lack of information by which to assess the quality of IA investigations.