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C HAPTER 7: MONITORING, EVALUATION, AND F UNDING
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<br />The tasks of monitoring, evaluating, and securing funds
<br />for an oversight procedure may seem intimidating.
<br />However, as the following chapter indicates, there are
<br />many resources available that can assist oversight plan-
<br />ners to address these and other oversight planning tasks.
<br />Notes
<br />1. Vera Institute of Justice,Processing Complaints
<br />Against Police in New York City: The Complainant’s
<br />Perspective,New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 1989.
<br />2. For additional guidelines for program evaluation, see
<br />Walker, Samuel,Police Accountability: The Role of
<br />Citizen Oversight,Belmont, California: Wadsworth,
<br />forthcoming.
<br />3. Walker, Samuel, and Vic W. Bumphus, “The
<br />Effectiveness of Civilian Review: Observations on
<br />Recent Trends and New Issues Regarding the Civilian
<br />Review of Police,”American Journal of Police 11 (4)
<br />(1992): 1–26.
<br />4. It is possible to calculate mean costs by using another
<br />standard besides complaints filed. However, complaints
<br />filed appear to be the most universal activity among over-
<br />sight systems, if audits and reviews of cases are consid-
<br />ered within the definition of “filings.”
<br />5. The mean cost per complaint filed may not be correct
<br />for all systems. In Minneapolis and San Francisco, hear-
<br />ings and mediations for some complaints that are filed
<br />are not conducted until the following calendar year, while
<br />some complaints that are heard were filed the previous
<br />year. As a result, the mean cost was calculated by divid-
<br />ing the budgets for these programs by the number of
<br />cases investigated in 1997, exclusive of the number of
<br />hearings and mediations held that year.
<br />6. In its 1996 report to the city council examining
<br />reconfigured options for its oversight mechanism,
<br />Tucson city staff provided startup, first-year, and recur-
<br />ring cost projections for five different types of oversight
<br />responsibilities, ranging from an expanded intake func-
<br />tion to subpoena power to an independent auditor model
<br />(see appendix E).
<br />7. National Public Radio, Morning Edition, July 31,
<br />1997, “Policing the Police.”
<br />8. However, the Board of Supervisors in San Francisco,
<br />not the police department, establishes the Office of
<br />Citizen Complaints’ budget.
<br />9. San Francisco Examiner,“The Starving Watchdog,”
<br />June 17, 1997.
<br />10. To avoid funding cuts, some oversight staff may be
<br />tempted to accept cases for investigation or review cases
<br />that do not merit intake. One city council calculates its
<br />oversight body’s cost per complaint. Because the number
<br />of complaints declined one year, the cost per complaint
<br />rose. As a result, some council members felt the board’s
<br />funding should be reduced. Funding for Berkeley’s
<br />Police Review Commission has changed significantly
<br />and frequently over the years, for example, going from
<br />$346,233 in 1994 to $196,732 in 1996 to $277,000 in
<br />1998.
<br />11. Investigators earn from $46,000 to $56,000, senior
<br />investigators earn from $50,000 to $62,000, and the
<br />chief investigator earns from $54,000 to $71,000. In
<br />Minneapolis, Civilian Police Review Authority investiga-
<br />tors earn from $38,000 to $51,000.
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