Document of Interest Provided By Councilmember Hamann on Civilian Review Boards

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E XECUTIVE S UMMARY x • Type 2 systems, in which citizens review the internal affairs unit’s findings (e.g., Orange County, Rochester, St. Paul), tend to be inexpensive because volunteers typically conduct the reviews. • Type 3 systems, in which citizens review com- plainants’ appeals of police findings (Portland), can also be inexpensive because of the use of volunteers. • Type 4 systems, in which auditors inspect the police or sheriff’s department’s own complaint investigation process (Portland, Tucson), tend to fall in the midlevel price range. On one hand, like type 1 systems, only a paid professional has the expertise and time to conduct a proper audit. On the other hand, typically only one person needs to be hired because the auditing process is less time consuming than conducting investigations of citizen complaints. In practice, however, there is an inconsistent relationship between oversight type and cost. This is because, when examined closely, many oversight operations are not “pure” examples of a type 1, 2, 3, or 4 system. For exam- ple, two jurisdictions have combined two different over- sight approaches: Portland has a citizen appeals board (type 3) and an auditor who monitors the police bureau’s complaint investigation process (type 4); Tucson has both a citizen board that reviews internal affairs findings (type 2) and an auditor (type 4). Consequently, the actual cost for a given type of oversight system may be more or less expensive than the cost of a pure type. Furthermore, each type of oversight system can incorporate features that may increase or decrease its expenses, ranging from providing policy recommendations to a mediation option. The choice of staffing option also will affect expenditures, including using volunteer staff or in-kind services and materials, hir- ing paid staff, or diverting part of the time of an existing city or police employee to oversight functions. As a result, it is difficult to predict an oversight system’s actual costs before determining all its features and activities. Finally, more money may not buy more oversight activity or increase use of the system—that is, boost the number of complaints, hearings, mediations, policy rec- ommendations, reviews, or audits. A variety of cost- insensitive considerations—the public’s perception of the system’s fairness, the director’s impartiality and talent, the level of cooperation from the police or sheriff’s department, and restrictions on the kinds of complaints the system will be prohibited from handling or required to accept—can prevent additional funds from resulting in increased use of the oversight system. That said, an over- sight procedure that is underfunded will not only have difficulty achieving its objectives, it also may create more controversy surrounding police accountability than it resolves. Conclusions This report suggests at least four other significant con- clusions regarding citizen oversight of the police. Local jurisdictions that wish to establish citizen review have to take on the responsibility to make difficult choices about the type of oversight system they should fashion.The tremendous variation in how the nine over- sight systems described in this report conduct business— and pay for their activities—may seem discouraging: The lack of similarity makes it difficult for other jurisdictions to make an automatic selection of commonly implemented citizen review features around which they can structure their own oversight procedures. On the positive side, this diversity means jurisdictions do not have to feel obligated to follow slavishly any one model or approach; they have the freedom to tailor the various components of their sys- tem to the particular needs and characteristics of their pop- ulations, law enforcement agencies, statutes, collective bargaining agreements, and pressure groups. Many individuals and groups believe that citizen oversight, despite its serious limitations, can have important benefits.Complainants have reported that they: • Feel “validated” when the oversight body agrees with their allegations—or when they have an opportunity to be heard by an independent overseer regardless of the outcome. • Are satisfied at being able to express their concerns in person to the officer. • Feel they are contributing to holding the department accountable for officers’ behavior.