Laserfiche WebLink
4. The proper standard of review is the easily met rational <br /> relationship standard. <br /> In light of the foregoing, it is highly unlikely that any Court would ever apply <br /> strict scrutiny in addressing an equal protection challenge to the proposed amendment. <br /> Instead, the applicable standard is"rational relationship," sometimes called "rational <br /> basis,"scrutiny,which the United States Supreme Court itself has described as "the most <br /> relaxed and tolerant form of judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause." City of <br /> Dallas v. Staglin, 490 U.S. at 26. All South Bend would have to show is that the <br /> inclusion of sexual orientation and gender identity in the Ordinance has some rational <br /> relationship to a legitimate interest of the City of South Bend. Id.; City of Cleburne, 473 <br /> U.S. at 446. Moreover, "[i]n the local economic sphere, it is only the invidious <br /> discrimination, the wholly arbitrary act, which cannot stand consistently with the <br /> Fourteenth Amendment." Id. Unquestionably, South Bend can show without difficulty <br /> that adding GLBT persons to the list of those against whom employers and landlords may <br /> not discriminate is rationally related to the City's legitimate interest in creating a level, <br /> discrimination free playing field for all of those who work or rent property in South <br /> Bend. <br /> IV. CONCLUSION <br /> Indiana municipalities have the statutory authority to create and amend their civil <br /> rights ordinances pursuant to the Indiana Home Rule Act and the Indiana Civil Rights <br /> Act. The Home Rule Act grants municipalities broad powers, and Indiana Courts have <br /> construed the Act broadly. Adding sexual orientation and gender identity as protected <br /> classes does not conflict with the Indiana Civil Rights Act. Indiana Courts have <br /> repeatedly ruled that conflict exists between a local ordinance and a state statute only <br /> where an ordinance forbids that which the statue permits, not where an ordinance merely <br /> supplements the protections that the statute already provides. Such supplemental burdens <br /> need only be logically consistent with the statutory purpose. The stated purpose of the <br /> Indiana Civil Rights Act is "the 12romotion of a ual opportunity without regard to race, <br /> religion, color, sex, disability, national origin, or ancestry through reasonable methods." <br /> The explicitly stated public policy underlying the Indiana Civil Rights Act is to end <br /> discrimination and provide equal opportunity in employment and housing for all of the <br /> state's citizens. The evidence presented to the South Bend City Council clearly shows <br /> that South Bend cannot promote equal opportunity for all of its citizens without adding <br /> sexual orientation and gender identity to the Ordinance. The proposed amendment is <br /> unquestionably logically consistent with the statutory purpose and broad public policy <br /> underlying the Indiana Civil Rights Act. <br /> Existing case law suggests that a federal equal protection challenge to the <br /> proposed amendment would meet with little success. Based on the legislative record <br /> described above, South Bend should be able to demonstrate a compelling governmental <br /> interest in protecting GLBT persons from discrimination. It is, however, highly unlikely <br /> that the City would have to make such a showing if faced with a federal equal protection <br /> challenge. The appropriate standard of review for a Court to apply when conducting an <br /> 16 <br />