Laserfiche WebLink
heightened or intermediate scrutiny analysis—are commonly referred to in federal case <br /> law as "quasi-suspect"classes. Id. <br /> In order to challenge the proposed amendment on equal:protection grounds—and <br /> have a court apply.a"strict scrutiny"test rather than a"rational relationship"test—GLBT <br /> rights opponents would have to assert that(1)landlords and employers(or tenants and <br /> employees) are a suspect class, (2) GLBT persons are a suspect class, or(3) the <br /> Ordinance as amended somehow burdens a fundamental personal right of the landlords, <br /> employers, tenants, or employees. It is highly unlikely that GLBT rights opponents <br /> would make the first or second argument, and it appears equally unlikely that they would <br /> prevail on the third. <br /> 2. There is no suspect class at issue here. <br /> At first glance, the United States Supreme Court case that might seem most <br /> closely analogous to this situation is City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 <br /> (1989). In Croson, the City of Richmond passed a municipal city ordinance that created <br /> minority set-asides in the awarding of government contracts. In other words, the <br /> ordinance created a preference for minority contractors; the minority contractors had to <br /> be awarded a certain percentage of government construction contracts. Non-minority <br /> contractors challenged the ordinance on equal protection grounds. The U.S. Supreme <br /> Court, applying a strict scrutiny standard, found that the ordinance violated the Equal <br /> Protection Clause because there was no compelling governmental interest supporting a <br /> racial preference. In other words, there was no compelling governmental interest that <br /> required race-based discrimination against non-minority contractors. <br /> The Croson Court applied a strict scrutiny analysis to the equal protection claim <br /> because, under the ordinance at issue, non-minority contractors were de facto being <br /> discriminated against on the basis of race(a suspect class). The Court reasoned that, <br /> because it applied strict scrutiny in cases where racial minorities were claiming equal <br /> protection violations, it had to apply'the same level of scrutiny when non-minority <br /> persons claimed that they had been denied equal protection because of preferences <br /> granted to racial minorities. <br /> Neither Croson, nor its strict scrutiny standard, should have any bearing on the <br /> proposed amendment. It is critically important to realize that by adding sexual orientation <br /> and gender identity to the Ordinance, South Bend would not be giving GLBT persons any <br /> preference,because of their sexual orientation or gender identity. To the contrary, the <br /> purpose of the amendment is to grant GLBT persons a level playing field with non-GLBT <br /> persons in employment and housing. The proposed amendment would neither force <br /> employers to hire a particular quota of GLBT persons, nor force landlords to offer <br /> housing to a particular number of GLBT persons. In other words, the proposed <br /> amendment would not exclude non-GLBT persons from any housing or employment <br /> opportunities because of their non-GLBT status. <br /> 12 <br />