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presumes that even improvident decisions will eventuaIly be <br /> rectified by the democratic processes. <br /> The general rule gives way;however,when a statute classifies <br /> by race, alienage, or national origin.These factors are so seldom <br /> relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that <br /> the laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect <br /> prejudice and antipathy --a view that those in the burdened <br /> class are not as worthy or deserving as others. For these reasons <br /> and because such discrimination is unlikely to be soon rectified <br /> by legislative means, these laws are subjected to strict scrutiny <br /> and will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a <br /> compelling state interest. Similar oversight by the courts is due <br /> when state laws impinge on personal rights protected by the <br /> Constitution. <br /> Legislative classifications based on gender also call for a <br /> heightened standard of review. That factor generally provides <br /> no sensible ground for differential treatment . . . . A gender <br /> classification falls unless it is substantially related to a <br /> sufficiently important governmental interest. Because <br /> illegitimacy is beyond the individual's control. . . . <br /> discriminations resting on that characteristic are also subject to <br /> somewhat heightened review. Those restrictions "will survive <br /> equal protection scrutiny to the extent they are substantially <br /> related to a legitimate state interest." <br /> We have declined, however, to extend heightened scrutiny <br /> review to differential treatment based on age. . . . . The lesson <br /> of Murgia [the age case] is that where individuals in the group <br /> affected by a law have distinguishing characteristics relevant to <br /> interest the State has the authority to implement, the courts have <br /> been very reluctant, as they should be in our federal system and <br /> with our respect for the separation of powers, to closely <br /> scrutinize legislative choices as to whether, how and to what <br /> extent those interests should be pursued. In such cases, the <br /> Equal Protection Clause requires only a rational means to serve <br /> a legitimate end. <br /> City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440-441 (1985) (citations <br /> omitted) (emphasis added). <br /> Race, alienage, and national origin--the classifications to which the U.S. <br /> Supreme Court has afforded the benefit of"strict scrutiny"analysis—are commonly <br /> referred to as "suspect classes"in federal case law. See, e.g., Nabozny v Podlesny, 92 <br /> F.3 d 446, 458 (7th Cir. 1996). Sex and illegitimacy—the classifications granted <br /> 11 <br />