REGULAR MEETING
<br />"Any power conferred upon a city by this chapter
<br />(18- 1 -1.5 -1 - 18- 1- 1.5 -30) or by any other law shall
<br />be exercised only in accordance with such method or
<br />procedure as may be provided by law. If no method
<br />or procedure is provided by law for the exercise of
<br />any such power, the common council of any city may,
<br />by ordinance, provide a method or procedure for the
<br />exercise of such power, and may limit the exercise
<br />of any power in any manner not in conflict with this
<br />chapter or any other law. (I.C. 971, 18- 1- 1.5 -17,
<br />as added by Acts 1971, P.L. 250, 1 1, p. 955.)."
<br />FEBRUARY 9, 1976
<br />Presently no procedures exist whereby an investigation can be conducted of the January 19,
<br />incident involving Councilman Kopczynski and Councilman Taylor. If such procedures were
<br />to be developed they would have to be approved by ordinance as provided by Section 17. In
<br />view of the serious effect which a discipline proceeding can have on an elected representative'.
<br />reputation in the community, it is the opinion of this office that any procedures which are de-
<br />veloped by the Common Council for the internal discipline of its members in the future should
<br />be subject to strict due process guarantees. It is the further opinion of this office that the
<br />retroactive application of such strict due process guarantees to the January 19th incident raise
<br />serious questions relative to the right of the Council to punish a member for activities which
<br />occurred prior to the enactment of due process procedures. In view of the ex post facto nature
<br />of any procedure which might be developed to apply to an investigation of the January 19 in-
<br />cident it is the opinion of this office that any such investigation would likely be outside the
<br />scope of authority and jurisdiction of the Council since the rights of the Councilman to be
<br />investigated would be inadequately protected. Be advised that this memorandum of law is pro-
<br />vided pursuant to the direction of the Common Council and is not to be construed as a ratifica-
<br />tion of any prior action by the Common Council or any of its members relative to the January 19
<br />incident nor is it to be construed as a willingness on the part of the City Attorney's office
<br />to furnish advice to the Common Council relative to this incident in the future except insofar
<br />as the Common Council is determined to be acting within the scope of its authority and jurisdic
<br />tion.
<br />Council President Parent then called upon the Council attorney to submit her report.
<br />Kathleen Cekanski, Council attorney, read her report: Powers of Common Councils in Second
<br />Class Cities to punish its own members for alledged disorderly behavior. I. INTRODUCTION
<br />Pursuant to your request of February 2, 1976, this memorandum sets forth much of the informa-
<br />tion discovered when researching the above - entitled topic. It is divided into seven (7) main
<br />sections, namely: I. Introduction, II. Issues Presented, III. Federal Precedents, IV. The
<br />State of Indiana, V. The City of South Bend, VI. Conclusion and Recommendations, VII. Biblio
<br />graphy. In order to have a thorough understanding of many of the practical and legal issues
<br />involved, it is requested that each council member review in its entirety the entire memoradum
<br />before taking any action on this topic. II. ISSUES PRESENTED (1) Do legislators at the
<br />Federal level have the right to discipline one of its own members? (See III) (2) Do legislator
<br />at the state level have the right to discipline one of its own members? (see IV) (3) Do common
<br />councils of second class cities within the state of Indiana have the right to discipline one of
<br />its own members? (see V) III. FEDERAL-PRECEDENTS The question of whether a legislature has
<br />the right to inquire into and possibly discipline its own members is addressed in the U.S. Con-
<br />stitution. Article I, Section 5, Clause 2 provides: Each House may determine the rules of its
<br />proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and with the concurrence of two - thirds
<br />expel a member. It is from this provision that our legislative branch gains self - regulations.
<br />The Supreme Court case of Powell vs. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) is most applicable. This
<br />case involved the question of whether Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., who was duly elected to serve
<br />in the U. S. House of Representatives for the 90th Congress, could be excluded from his seat
<br />based on the allegations of misappropriation of public funds and abuse of process-in the New
<br />York courts. The _Supreme Court held in a declaratory judgment that this exclusion was unlaw-
<br />ful, IBID, p. 489. However, the constitutional aspects of the Powell case give excellent stan
<br />dards for legislative inquiries into its own members: Unquestionably, Congress has an interes
<br />in preserving its institutional integrity, but in most cases that interest can be sufficiently
<br />safeguarded by the exercise of its power to punish its members for disorderly behavior and in
<br />extreme cases, to expel a member with the concurrence of two- thirds. Congress has on specific
<br />occasions disciplined its own members. Such legislative punishment should be rational and
<br />relate to the purpose for which they are applied. For example "a loss of seniority as punish-
<br />ment for disruptive behavior or misuse of a committee chairmanship would undoubtedly be reason-
<br />able and thus constitutional." The test should ultimately be one of "balancing the appropriat
<br />ness of a decision against the need for it. The relevant factors to be considered would in-
<br />clude the degree of harm to the complainant, if immediate relief was denied; the likelihood
<br />the legislature will report the alledged transgression and rectify it without intervention, an
<br />the significance of legal standards in resolving the dispute. Thus except as regards to ex-
<br />press constitutional prohibitions, the choices regarding grounds of punishment, procedures,
<br />and sanctions have been left largely to the discretion of each house. Examples of punishment
<br />for fellow legislators have included taking away seniority, fines, public and private censure,
<br />suspension and change of committee assignments. Suspension has only been used twice in the
<br />cases of Senators McLauren and Tillman; whereas censure has been used with the more recent ex-
<br />ample of Senator Dodd. The minimum requirements of proper notice, hearing and review was met
<br />in each of these situations, and were governed by strict legal procedures. Thus the power to
<br />discipline fellow legislators at the federal level is well - founded in our legislative history.
<br />IV. THE STATE OF INDIANA The constitution of the State of Indiana also provides for dis-
<br />orderly behavior to be punished. Article 4, Section 14 provides that: Either House may
<br />punish its members for disorderly behavior and may, with the concurrence of two- thirds, expel
<br />a member; but not a second time for the same cause. Thus the language is almost identical to
<br />Article I, Section 5, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution.
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