Document of Interest Provided By Councilmember Hamann on Civilian Review Boards

Home Browse Search

C HAPTER 7: MONITORING, EVALUATION, AND F UNDING 134 The relationship between cost and oversight type There is a theoretical relationship between the four types of oversight systems (see chapter 1) and cost. • Type 1 oversight systems, in which citizens investigate allegations and recommend findings (Berkeley, Flint, Minneapolis, San Francisco), are the most expensive because, as previously noted, professional investigators must be hired to conduct the investigations—lay citi- zens do not have the expertise or the time. • Type 2 systems, in which citizens review internal affairs findings (e.g., Orange County, Rochester, St. Paul), tend to be inexpensive because volunteers typically con- duct the reviews. • Type 3 systems, in which citizens review complainants’ appeals of police findings (Portland), also can be inexpensive because of the use of volunteers. • Type 4 systems, in which auditors inspect the police or sheriff department’s own complaint investigation process (Portland, Tucson), tend to fall in the midlevel price range. On the one hand, like type 1 systems, only a professional has the expertise and time to conduct a proper audit. On the other hand, typically only one person needs to be hired because the auditing process is much less time consuming than conducting investi- gations of citizen complaints. In practice,however, there is an inconsistent relationship between oversight type and cost. This is because, when examined closely, many oversight operations are not “pure” examples of a type 1, 2, 3, or 4 system. As a result, the actual cost for a given type of oversight system may be more or less expensive than what a pure type would cost. For example, San Francisco’s type 1 system requires extra staff to prosecute cases at chief’s hearings and police commission trials. While type 2 sys- tems (e.g., Orange County, St. Paul) generally cost rela- tively little, Rochester’s budget is more than $128,000 in part because paid staff are involved in training and certifying citizen reviewers as mediators and in subcon- tracting for mediation of selected cases. There are other reasons why there is frequently no direct relationship between type of oversight system and cost: • Flint’s ombudsman system probably achieves some economies of scale because it investigates complaints from all city agencies, not just the police. • The actual cost of any oversight system depends on the number of complaints it hears, which in turn hinges on many considerations that are independent of its budget, such as the kinds of complaints its charter permits it to accept or review and how frequently officers in the local depart- ment engage in misconduct. For example, some type 1 oversight sys- tems investigate almost all citizen complaints (e.g., Minneapolis, San Francisco), while others investigate only some (e.g., Berkeley, Flint). • Type 1 and 2 oversight systems (e.g., Minneapolis) can reduce the expense of holding hearings or conducting reviews by diverting some cases to mediation. • Labor market rates for investigators and executive directors can influence an oversight system’s costs, as can the use of inhouse staff versus contracted staff who receive no fringe benefits. • Different systems provide different stipends to volun- teer board members. For example, Berkeley provides $3, while Rochester provides $35 (totaling $15,800 in its 1997 budget). In sum, it is difficult to predict what an oversight sys- tem’s actual costs will be before agreeing on what all its components and activities will be and before selecting from among many mechanisms—and combinations of mechanisms—for paying for oversight activities. That said, it is still important to provide a level of funding that will make it possible to investigate, hear, or audit all the cases a program can expect to handle.6 It is difficult to predict what an oversight system’s actual costs will be before agreeing on what all its components and activities will be.