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C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE: APPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION <br />119 <br />• Delays in case processing. <br />• The fairness of the procedures. <br />For example, according to Liana Perez, Tucson’s auditor, <br />“It’s better not to try to get subpoena power because then <br />the union ties you up in court.” Furthermore, many over- <br />sight staff and researchers believe that subpoena power is <br />not a particularly useful tool. (See the discussion of sub- <br />poena power in chapter 5, “Addressing Important Issues <br />in Citizen Oversight.”) Other examples of meeting the <br />union half way follow. <br />• The Rochester corporate counsel worked closely with <br />the city council and the mayor to fashion an oversight <br />procedure that would not be subject to a successful <br />union suit. For example, the city council attorney <br />reported that giving the Civilian Review Board authori- <br />ty to establish mandatory findings and discipline would <br />make it vulnerable to litigation by the union, and the <br />union already had said it would sue if the council <br />granted the board these powers. As a result, this author- <br />ity was omitted from the legislation. <br />• Rochester’s first review board included police officers <br />to accommodate union concerns. Later, the city council <br />enacted legislation excluding them. The Rochester police <br />union consented to a mediation option after the city <br />council agreed to exclude any final signed agreement <br />and to call the process “conciliation,” not “mediation.” <br />• Board members in another jurisdiction agreed to base <br />their findings on clear and convincing evidence rather <br />than on a preponderance of the evidence after the <br />union agreed that officers could be required to testify. <br />• To address the concerns that the oversight system could <br />cost the union money, the Minneapolis statute requires <br />that the Civilian Police Review Board pay the union’s <br />legal fees when a complaint is not sustained after the <br />executive director has found probable cause. <br />• When first appointed, Lisa Botsko, Portland’s first <br />auditor, met with the union president and treasurer <br />initially “just to get to know them, learn their perspec- <br />tives, and tell them what I do.” One of the grievances <br />they expressed to Botsko was how long it took to <br />process complaints. As a result, Botsko developed <br />timelines for everyone involved in the review process. <br />Make sure the review process is scrupulously fair <br />Some union leaders report they have no objection to <br />citizen review as long as it treats officers fairly. <br />• I wasn’t opposed to citizen review; I had researched it <br />and hadn’t found that citizen review burns cops. I just <br />didn’t want it to be one sided. <br />—Butch Swinteck, treasurer, St. Paul Police Officers’ <br />Union <br />• The concept of oversight is excellent; it builds citizen <br />trust in the department: We can’t be accused of cover- <br />ing anything up. The problem lies in the practice—the <br />procedure attracts staff with an axe to grind against us. <br />For civilian review of law enforcement to function <br />properly, all parties to it, including officers, must <br />perceive the process to be impartial and professional. <br />—John Evans, officer representative, San Francisco <br />Police Officers’Association <br />According to Mark Gissiner, president of the International <br />Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement <br />from 1995–99, “Police officers feel that oversight has a <br />third standard for judging officers in addition to criminal <br />behavior and violation of general orders. But there should <br />not be any other standard; either the behavior is a crime <br />or a violation of general orders—or it is not. A lot of peo- <br />ple feel oversight should be an advocate for complainants <br />because no one else seems to represent them. But over- <br />sight should not; it should be a factfinder only with the <br />authority to make recommendations based on its find- <br />ings.” Of course, once an oversight body finds for the <br />complainant, depending on its legislative mandate, it <br />may have to end up acting on the complainant’s behalf. <br />According to Lt. Steve Young, vice president of the <br />Grand Lodge, Fraternal Order of Police, in addition to <br />basic fairness, “Union leaders are concerned that any <br />oversight system follow due process in how they treat <br />officers.” Oversight bodies should, in consultation with <br />the union, investigate thoroughly the due process rights <br />of officers reflected in State statute, case law, and labor’s <br />contract with the department. For example, some union <br />contracts require that matters of discipline must be dealt <br />with during working hours. Other contracts limit the <br />information oversight bodies can disseminate to com- <br />plainants or the general public. The oversight director <br />can distribute a summary of these rights to all staff and <br />volunteers, ask the union to report when it believes a