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C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE: APPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION <br />115 <br />file. A reasonable compromise may be for the over- <br />sight body not to report unsustained findings to the <br />police or sheriff’s department or for the department not <br />to include them in the officer’s file until the number of <br />unsustained findings has reached an agreed-upon mini- <br />mum number during a specified period of time (e.g., <br />three findings during a 2-year period). <br />• Police IA units themselves add allegations to citi- <br />zens’—or their own—complaints against officers. The <br />Rochester Police Department’s IA unit added what it <br />calls 12 “satellite issues” as a result of investigations <br />initiated for other reasons in 1997. A letter the Tucson <br />Police Department sent to one complainant noted, <br />“This complaint has been closed as OTHER, meaning <br />that the Officer committed a violation of TPD [Tucson <br />Police Department] Rules and Procedures other <br />than the alleged violation.” In other <br />words, in adding allegations, citizen <br />oversight bodies are merely follow- <br />ing in police footsteps. In some <br />jurisdictions, such as San Francisco, <br />oversight bodies are required to <br />investigate any added allegations <br />they discover because their charter <br />mandates that they investigate any <br />wrongdoing they uncover. Never- <br />theless, San Francisco’s internal <br />affairs unit is trying to work with <br />the Office of Citizen Complaints on not generating <br />added allegations that do not represent deliberate mis- <br />conduct—for example, claiming an officer recorded <br />the wrong code on a report. Finally, on the one hand, <br />added allegations are not citizen complaints and there- <br />fore, absent a legal mandate to investigate them, might <br />be considered beyond the oversight body’s purview. <br />On the other hand, few citizens are familiar with their <br />police or sheriff’s department general orders and there- <br />fore are unaware when an officer’s behavior violates <br />these orders. A possible reconciliation of this dilemma <br />may be for oversight bodies to ask the complainant if <br />he or she would like to add any instances of miscon- <br />duct discovered by the oversight body to the original <br />complaint. If the complainant does not wish to add <br />them, the oversight body could inform the department <br />of the additional violations without including them as <br />part of the complaint. <br />• Board decisions can benefit, not just harm, officers <br />who are sued civilly. In one case, a citizen whose com- <br />plaint a board did not sustain filed a civil suit, and the <br />city attorney had the oversight investigator testify. The <br />investigator’s testimony helped the officer have the suit <br />dismissed. (See chapter 1, “Introduction,” for further <br />evidence that citizen oversight can prevent or reduce <br />award amounts in civil suits.) Whenever the depart- <br />ment is sued, the Portland Police Bureau internal <br />affairs unit shares with loss-control personnel reports <br />that the Portland auditor routinely sends it in case the <br />information can help the department’s case. <br />• Delay is a product of many people. Also, slowness is <br />often an unavoidable feature of many oversight bodies <br />because they are overworked and understaffed, just as <br />it can take years for Federal and State equal opportuni- <br />ty employment commissions to hear <br />cases. Providing citizen oversight bod- <br />ies with adequate personnel and fund- <br />ing often can reduce delays dramati- <br />cally, as happened when San Francisco <br />funded additional investigators for <br />the Office of Citizen Complaints. <br />Oversight bodies, such as Berkeley’s, <br />also can develop a process for sum- <br />marily dismissing inappropriate com- <br />plaints to reduce delays involved in <br />scheduling hearings on legitimate <br />complaints. Orange County allows board members to <br />place noncontroversial complaints on a “consent agen- <br />da,” bypassing the need for further discussion. <br />• Oversight staff and police need to meet and talk, <br />whether to iron out specific misconceptions or con- <br />flicts or to share information about what they are <br />doing. According to Prentice Sanders, assistant chief <br />of the San Francisco Police Department, in 1997 the <br />police commission chairperson invited OCC and the <br />police department as well as interested citizen groups <br />to four roundtable discussions run by two independent <br />professional facilitators to address concerns about the <br />oversight process. Everyone looked for common <br />ground. All agreed there was a problem with cases tak- <br />ing too long that needed to be addressed. They also <br />agreed to talk to each other in the future if a problem <br />arose before going to the press. <br />Oversight staff and police <br />need to meet and talk, <br />whether to iron out <br />specific misconceptions <br />or conflicts or to share <br />information about what <br />they are doing.