Document of Interest Provided By Councilmember Hamann on Civilian Review Boards

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C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE: APPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION 111 give little or no weight to the oversight body’s finding in determining discipline. In some jurisdictions, chiefs and sheriffs accept internal affairs findings and decide on dis- cipline long before they even receive the oversight body’s findings. Some have never changed an IA finding as a result of an oversight finding that was different. Jurisdictions have used a variety of strategies to address concerns about outside involvement in police matters. In most jurisdictions, local government has established oversight bodies that are only advisory; their recommenda- tions are nonbinding on departments. Some review bodies can appeal the chief’s or sheriff’s rejection of their recommendations to elected or appointed officials who can require the department to act. However, because these officials have this authority regardless of whether there is an over- sight body, the oversight procedure itself does not further diminish the police or sheriff’s department’s authority. Even when citi- zen oversight bodies do have some authority over the police, they have generally exercised it cautiously. For example, Flint and St. Paul have never used their subpoe- na power to compel officers to testify; Orange County and St. Paul have never exercised their right to hire an inde- pendent investigator to second-guess an IA investigation. Many internal affairs and other procedures for investigat- ing citizen complaints are already rigorous. However, the process typically is only as effective as the current chief or sheriff requires it to be. Advocates of citizen oversight believe it is important to have an independent review mechanism in place that can help IA maintain its stan- dards in case the next chief or sheriff fails to demand— and ensure—fairness and thoroughness in the internal complaint investigations process. In addition, even with a conscientious chief or sheriff, because of turnover there are usually some IA investiga- tors who are not yet fully skilled in their jobs—and who may switch assignments after they have become fully qualified. Finally, even when a police or sheriff’s department is being conscientious in imposing appropriate discipline without citizen review, an oversight procedure can reassure skeptical citizens that the agency is indeed following through responsibly on citizen complaints. Citizens do not understand police work Some police oppose citizen oversight procedures because they believe that oversight staff, lacking experi- ence as police officers or sheriff’s deputies, cannot determine fairly whether officers have engaged in mis- conduct. Officers frequently observe that State medical boards composed only of physicians investigate doctors for malpractice, and only attorneys investigate lawyers for misconduct. Similarly, some police argue, only law enforcement officers have the knowledge to investigate and judge other sworn personnel. SHOULD CITIZENS CONTROL THE DISCIPLINE PROCESS? Most oversight directors and researchers agree that citizens should not have power to discipline officers.They believe that giving citizen oversight systems that authority would be illegal or unwise because: • It would violate State law, city charter, or collective bargaining agreements with police unions. • It would detract from holding the chief or sheriff accountable for ensuring proper standards of professional conduct, making it possible for the top law enforcement executive to argue,“Yes, my department has a problem with police misconduct, but I can’t do anything about it.” * * Luna, Eileen, and Samuel Walker,A Report on the Oversight Mechanisms of the Albuquerque Police Department,prepared for the Albuquerque City Council, 1997: 148. Advocates of citizen over- sight believe it is important to have an independent review mechanism in place that can help IA maintain its standards in case the next chief or sheriff fails to demand—and ensure— fairness and thoroughness in the internal complaint investigations process.