Document of Interest Provided By Councilmember Hamann on Civilian Review Boards

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C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE: APPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION 109 3. Specify precisely the review system’s objectives. Without specific objectives such as the ones listed in chapter 7, “Monitoring, Evaluation, and Funding,” the involved parties may lock horns because they have different expectations of what the system should be doing and accomplishing. Even if all the involved par- ties do not agree on what the oversight system should be trying to accomplish, at least they will have the same understanding of its goals. That said, it remains true that the most severe antagonism surrounding citizen oversight is usually between the oversight body and the police or sheriff’s department and between the review process and union leaders. This chap- ter reviews some of the principal sources of conflict between oversight bodies and law enforcement agen- cies—including police unions—and suggests possible solutions. Police Criticisms of Oversight Procedures Exhibit 6–1 summarizes the concerns many police and sheriff’s departments express about citizen oversight along with possible responses to their concerns. As shown in the exhibit and discussed below, these concerns generally fall into three categories: 1. Oversight procedures represent outside interference. 2. Oversight staff lack experience with and understand- ing of police work. 3. The oversight process is unfair. Citizens should not interfere with police work Most police administrators believe their agencies should have the final—and often only—say in matters of disci- pline, policies and procedures, and training. Police administrators feel they have to be held accountable for their officers’ behavior because they are in charge. Without final say over discipline, policy, and training, their accountability is undermined. (See “Should Citizens Control the Discipline Process?”) Police executives’ objections to citizen oversight some- times reflect their belief that they already do a good job responding to citizen complaints. As a result, when a finding from an oversight body disagrees with the department’s internal finding, some chiefs and sheriffs WORKING WITH ACTIVISTS Local activists have often been as critical of oversight systems as have police departments and unions. Sometimes they criticize the system’s lack of power; other times, they report that oversight staff are not using the authority they have to pursue cases of alleged police misconduct. One activist observed,“San Francisco’s citizen oversight organization has the most money and best structure in the Nation, yet it sustains only 10 percent of cases.” A newsletter published by Dan Handelman, a member of Portland Copwatch, an organization that tracks alleged police misconduct, objects to the fact that the Portland police chief can ignore, and in the newsletter’s opinion has ignored, reversals of IA findings by the city council acting in its capacity as the city’s oversight board. However, in one of the two recent examples when the chief did this, the council’s vote to reverse was 3 to 2, suggesting that there was room for honest disagreement. As a result, the chief’s decision in this case, although it rejected the council’s decision, was not necessarily arbitrary. However, the council’s vote in the second matter was 4 to 1. In any case, Handelman’s larger concern is that the city council—that is, elected citizens—not the chief, should have the final say in determining whether officers engaged in misconduct. According to a board member in another city,“Some groups are very vocal and bring police problems to the media and raise holy hell. But if they didn’t, we would not have achieved this level of oversight. So they play a beneficial role, but they can make life painful because they say some ridiculous things.”