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of whether removal is appropriate
<br />when "the state administrative
<br />review scheme provides for deferen-
<br />tial review of a state agency's deci-
<br />sion," the Seventh Circuit noted
<br />that the First and Fourth Circuits
<br />have interpreted the Supreme
<br />Court's ruling to mean that "dis-
<br />trict courts do not have jurisdiction
<br />to entertain such actions."
<br />Accordingly, upon considering
<br />the question of whether a state
<br />action is removable, the Seventh
<br />Circuit concluded that "the focus
<br />must be upon the character of the
<br />state proceeding and upon the na-
<br />ture of the review conducted by the
<br />state court." The court explained:
<br />If the state administrative review
<br />process provides for a trial de novo,
<br />removal of the action to federal court
<br />does not require the district court to
<br />perform an appellate function that is
<br />inconsistent with the character of the
<br />court of original jurisdiction. Under
<br />those circumstances, the state pro-
<br />ceeding can be termed a "civil ac-
<br />tion." If, however, the state adminis-
<br />trative review process requires the
<br />state court to proceed on the basis of
<br />a more deferential review of the state
<br />agency's findings and determinations,
<br />removal of the action to federal court
<br />would require the district court to
<br />perform an appellate role with re-
<br />spect to the decision of the state
<br />administrative agency.
<br />Emphasis added.
<br />Turning to the state actions at
<br />issue in this case, the Seventh Cir-
<br />cuit proceeded to analyze what the
<br />scope of judicial review would be
<br />had it been exercised by the Cook
<br />County Circuit Court, i.e., whether
<br />the actions could be characterized
<br />as a "civil action" or actions confer-
<br />ring appellate review. First, the
<br />court noted that the Illinois Ad-
<br />ministrative Review Act (IARA)
<br />"provides the exclusive method by
<br />which an aggrieved party may ob-
<br />tain judicial review of decisions
<br />made by certain administrative
<br />agencies in Illinois." The court then
<br />observed that the "judicial function
<br />performed by an Illinois court when
<br />it is exercising statutory ... juris-
<br />diction" is expressly limited by the
<br />IARA. While Illinois courts have
<br />interpreted this provision to allow
<br />consideration of constitutional
<br />claims in conjunction with IARA
<br />claims, the Seventh Circuit stated
<br />that the court is "bound by the
<br />record made at the administrative
<br />hearing" and "when the record is
<br />insufficient to permit a ruling on
<br />the constitutional claim, the court
<br />may remand the matter to the a-
<br />gency for further evidence."
<br />The Seventh Circuit thus con-
<br />cluded that "the scope of judicial
<br />review accorded by the IARA" in-
<br />volves a "deferential" rather than
<br />"de novo" standard of review and
<br />that "although the state trial
<br />court's review extends to 'all ques-
<br />tions of law and fact presented by
<br />the entire record,' it may not hear
<br />new evidence and must accept the
<br />agency's findings and conclusions
<br />on questions of fact as 'prima facie
<br />true and correct.'"
<br />Judicial review under the IARA
<br />is an "appellate proceeding" and "as
<br />such, it is not a 'civil action of
<br />which the district courts ... have
<br />original jurisdiction' within the
<br />meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)." By
<br />way of comparison, the Seventh
<br />Circuit determined that removal
<br />would be permissible if a separate
<br />§ 1983 claim were brought before a
<br />state court since review under such
<br />claims is not confined to the ad-
<br />ministrative record.
<br />4) 0
<br />0 .0
<br />Finally, the Seventh Circuit
<br />determined that the fact that the
<br />lawsuit involved both federal and
<br />state law claims did not alter its
<br />ruling. Since, under the court's
<br />analysis, the College's state law
<br />claim could not be characterized as
<br />a "'claim' in an 'original action',"
<br />the case "removed to the district
<br />court cannot be termed a 'civil
<br />action' ... of which the district
<br />courts ... have'original jurisdiction'
<br />within the meaning of section 1441
<br />(a)." Accordingly, the court ruled
<br />that removal of the College's law-
<br />suits to federal court
<br />"is barred" and its
<br />"claims must be
<br />remanded to the
<br />Circuit Court of
<br />Cook County for
<br />determination."
<br />Analysis
<br />The U.S. Su-
<br />preme Court's• re-
<br />view of the Seventh
<br />Circuit's recent deci-
<br />sion in International
<br />College of Surgeons
<br />should be closely
<br />watched. Although
<br />the issue before the Court does not
<br />directly involve a historic preserva-
<br />tion issue, affirmation of the circuit
<br />court's decision could be harmful
<br />to historic preservation, to the ex-
<br />tent that it limits a jurisdiction's
<br />ability to remove a case to federal
<br />court when defending a lawsuit
<br />that includes a number of constitu-
<br />tional claims, an important right in
<br />cases where the state courts do not
<br />follow established federal jurispru-
<br />dence. If the Seventh Circuit's rul-
<br />ing is affirmed, property owners
<br />could preclude federal court review
<br />simply by raising their federal
<br />claims in the context of an admin-
<br />istrative review.
<br />[Richard J. Brennan, Esq. of Win-
<br />ston & Strawn, Chicago, Ill., David
<br />B. Love, Esq., Seyfarth, Shaw, Fair-
<br />weather & Geraldson, Chicago, Ill.,
<br />and Daniel L. Houlihan, Esq., Hou-
<br />lihan & Associates, Chicago, Ill.,
<br />represented the International Col-
<br />lege of Surgeons, United States Sec-
<br />tion of the International College of
<br />Surgeons, and Robin
<br />Construction Corp.
<br />collectively. Susan S.
<br />Sher, Corporation
<br />Counsel of Chicago,
<br />Illinois, along with
<br />Lawrence Rosenthal,
<br />Deputy Corporation
<br />Counsel, Benna Ruth
<br />Solomon, Chief As-
<br />sistance Corporation
<br />Counsel, and Anne
<br />Berleman Kearney,
<br />Assistant Corpora-
<br />tion Counsel, repre-
<br />sented the City of
<br />Chicago, Commis-_
<br />cion on Chicago
<br />Landmarks, the Plan Commission,
<br />and individually named defen-
<br />dants.]
<br />Affirmation of the
<br />decision could be
<br />harmful to historic
<br />preservation, to the
<br />extent that it limits
<br />a municipality's
<br />ability to remove a
<br />case to federal
<br />court when defend-
<br />ing a lawsuit that
<br />includes a number
<br />of constitutional
<br />claims.
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