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view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as <br /> others. For these reasons and because such discrimination is unlikely to <br /> be soon rectified by legislative means, these laws are subjected to strict <br /> scrutiny and will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve <br /> a compelling state interest. Similar oversight by the courts is due when <br /> state laws irnning,.e on personal rights protected by the Constitution. <br /> Legislative classifications based on gender also call for a heightened <br /> standard of review. That factor generally provides no sensible ground <br /> for differential treatment . . .. A gender classification falls unless it is <br /> substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental interest. <br /> Because illegitimacy is beyond the individual's control. . . . <br /> discriminations resting on that characteristic are also subject to <br /> somewhat heightened review. Those restrictions"will survive equal <br /> protection scrutiny to the extent they are substantially related to a <br /> legitimate state interest." <br /> We have declined, however, to extend heightened scrutiny review to <br /> differential treatment based on age . . . . . The lesson of Murgia [the age <br /> case] is that where individuals in the group affected by a law have <br /> distinguishing characteristics relevant to interest the State has the <br /> authority to implement, the courts have been very reluctant, as they <br /> should be in our federal system and with our respect for the separation <br /> of powers, to closely scrutinize legislative choices as to whether, how <br /> And to what extent those interests should be pursued. In such cases, the <br /> Equal Protection Clause requires only a rational means to serve a <br /> legitimate end. <br /> City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440-441 (1985) (citations <br /> omitted) (emphasis added). <br /> Race, alienage, and national origin—the classifications to which the U.S. Supreme Court <br /> has afforded the benefit of"strict scrutiny"analysis—are commonly referred to as "suspect <br /> classes"in federal case law. See, e.g., Nabomy v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446,458 (7th Cir. 1996). <br /> Sex and illegitimacy—the classifications granted heightened or intermediate scrutiny analysis-- <br /> are commonly referred to in federal case law as "quasi-suspect"classes. Id. <br /> In order to challenge the proposed amendment on equal protection.grounds—and have a <br /> court apply a"strict scrutiny"test requiring a compelling governmental interest rather than a <br /> "rational relationship"test—it appears that GLBT rights opponents would have to assert that(1) <br /> some group of tenants or employees formed a suspect class, (2) GLBT persons are a suspect <br /> class, and the protections afforded by the amendment cause non-GLBT persons to suffer some <br /> sort of deprivation of equal protection because they are not GLBT, or(3)the ordinance as <br /> amended somehow burdens a fundamental personal right of non-GLBT tenants or employees <br /> 5 <br />