Laserfiche WebLink
85, 886 n.3. U.and only if, the regulation is found to be not religion-neutral or not generally <br /> applicable will courts scrutinize it further. Only legislation that receives this additional scrutiny <br /> "must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to <br /> advance that interest." Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. 520 (1993). <br /> To bring a free exercise.challenge against the ordinance after amendment, an individual <br /> would first have to argue that the ordinance is not religion-neutral and generally applicable. <br /> According to the Supreme Court, a law is not religion-neutral if its p=os e is to"infringe upon <br /> or restrict practices because of their religious motivation." Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533 (emphasis <br /> added). Absolutely nothing about the ordinance, as amended, would be designed to infringe <br /> upon or restrict anyone's religious practices. The ordinance is about preventing discrimination in <br /> housing and employment. It says nothing about religious practices. Adding gender identity and <br /> sexual orientation would not change that fact. While there may be a landlord or employer in <br /> South Bend who is willing to say that he or she discriminates against GLBT people in <br /> employment or housing as a religious practice, the ordinance itself, as amended to included <br /> sexual orientation and gender identity,would say nothing about preventing GLBT discrimination <br /> because the discrimination itself is a religious practice. The ordinance is, and would remain, <br /> religion-neutral. <br /> It is, therefore, highly improbable that a court faced with a free exercise challenge to the <br /> amended ordinance would ever come close to seeping evidence of compelling governmental <br /> interest for the amendment. To the contrary, all the court would have to do, after determining <br /> that the ordinance is religion-neutral and generally applicable, would be to determine whether it <br /> is reasonably related to a legitimate government interest. There is no basis for arguing that <br /> preventing sexual orientation and gender identity are not legitimate governmental interests. See, <br /> e.g., Hurley v. Irish American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995) <br /> (finding that laws which prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the <br /> provision of public accommodations are"well within the State's usual power to enact when a <br /> legislature has reason to believe that a given group is the target of discrimination......") <br /> B. First Amendment Freedom of Association <br /> The First Amendment also protects the "freedom of association"of persons to engage in <br /> activities the First,Amendment protects, like marriage and political speech. So if the Council <br /> were to tell a citizen who he could marry(called an "intimate association") or require him to <br /> admit someone into his political party with whom he did not agree(called an"expressive <br /> association'), then the Council would be required to show it was advancing a"compelling <br /> governmental interest" by doing so. But this ordinance does no such thing. It does not deal with <br /> associations organized for the purpose of advancing activities the First Amendment protects. <br /> Instead it deals with associations organized for the purpose of making money—landlords and <br /> employers. Therefore the First Amendment would not apply. <br /> 1. Intimate associations are not implicated. <br /> The First Amendment protects two types of"freedom of association rights." Roberts u <br /> United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617(1984). The first type is the right to"intimate <br /> 2 <br />